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On May 6, EU trade commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström went to the International Trade 
Committee (INTA) of the European Parliament 
to discuss a reform proposal for the investor 
dispute resolution to be incorporated into the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). The proposal was outlined by the 
commissioner in response to increased 
opposition to the current investment protection 
system with the aim of agreeing on a basis for 
discussion to establish what could be proposed 
in the TTIP negotiations with Parliament’s 
consent. The proposal served as a step to 
enable the commission to eventually negotiate 
far-reaching investment protection legislation. 
EU member states are already participating  in 
1400 international investment agreements, 
most of which suffer from deficiencies targeted 
in the TTIP debate.  During the meeting, many 
members of the committee emphasized the 
need for reform to prevent the same form of 
investment regulation from being  incorporated 
into the TTIP agreement. Their fear is that the 
regulation can be abused by corporate interests. 
An example is provided by Joseph Stiglitz 
(2015): Law suits have been started in 
Australia and Uruguay by Philip Morris against 
new legislation mandating more explicit 
cigarette health warning labels.  
 
The investor protection dispute mechanism is 
only one of many controversial aspects linked 
to market integration through the TTIP 
agreement. The only way for EU citizens to 
influence what is brought to the bargaining 
table is through Parliament and it is not 
surprising that anti-TTIP sentiments are taken 
up by many members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). These concerns should not 
be taken lightly as the negotiations require 
compromises for the agreement to be 
eventually approved. Indeed, there is 
overwhelming evidence that trade policy is 
strongly influenced by private sector interests. 
As clarified by Richard Baldwin (2014), 
today’s globalised production processes leads 
to political pressure to deepen trade 
liberalisation because firms are global profit-
maximising actors that gain from minimising 
transaction costs in international production 
networks. From this viewpoint, the main 
impetus behind the TTIP negotiations comes 
from political pressure led by the private 
sector.  
 
It is well-established that market integration 
leads to increased competition that results in 
price reductions and increased product variety. 
The enhanced competitive pressure favours 
firms that are more productive who gain from 
expanded market access at the expense of less 
productive firms. Overall, this increases 
industrial productivity. It is also clear that 
market integration expands that type of 
production which is internationally competitive 
and contracts other forms of production. This 
stimulates economic activity and job creation. 
There is no reason to expect the TTIP 
agreement to be different from other deep trade 
agreements in this respect. The bulk of trade 
creation from the TTIP would occur in 
services, where stark impediments to trade 
remain to date. For the EU and US economies, 
which are highly competitive in services, it is 
considered to be of central importance to 
liberalise trade in services to spur economic 
growth. Since the USA and EU have been 
unable to strongly enforce this goal in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
establishment of a TTIP agreement can be 
interpreted as a modified market-opening 
strategy. By joining forces and creating an 
economic super power, the agreement can be 
expected to give the thrust needed to liberalise 
international services markets as countries 
outside the TTIP will want to ensure producer 
 
access to the EU-US market. The nature of 
services’ trade implies that liberalisation clears 
behind-the-border barriers that have not 
traditionally been regarded as trade barriers. 
This necessarily involves the modification of 
national regulations and/or their 
implementation. One example is government 
procurement, which is tailor-made for domestic 
producers, that inhibits foreign investment.    
 
It is clear that the investment protection system 
needs to be changed. The European 
Parliament’s resolution on TTIP not only backs 
the trade commissioner’s reform proposals but 
further proposes that a public International 
Investment Court should be established in the 
medium term. This resolution, which was 
approved by the Parliament on July 8, provides 
negotiators with a strong mandate. One of 
Malmström’s  main aims as exemplified by her 
proposal is to work towards establishing a 
permanent multilateral system to handle  
investment disputes, which would in turn 
become a welcome step to ensure a transparent 
system that could create a ‘fair level playing 
field’ to enforce liberalisation of behind-the-
border investment barriers. If carefully 
planned, such a system could work to regulate 
investor and state behaviour and create gains 
for all much like the WTO (and former GATT) 
system has functioned in removing border 
trade barriers. While it is questionable whether 
the regulatory standards attained through TTIP 
would be well-suited to building a framework 
that safeguards the interests of members and 
non-members alike, EU-USA leadership in 
working towards the goal of creating a 
multilateral, transparent system to liberalise 
services trade may be the only way to realise 
the extensive reforms needed to counteract 
corporate abuse of the investor protection 
system.   
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